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NOTES AND COMMENT

should pay. In a case like this the question of forfeiture resolves itself
into a question of whether the insured intentionally and wilfully made
the misrepresentations. Bannon v. Ins. Co. of No. Amer., 115 Wis. 250.
WESLEY KUSWA.

Corporations: Compensation of Directors. Recovery by Minority
Stockholder.
Thauer vs. Gaebler et al, 232 N.W. 561. Action commenced on
September 21, 1929 by plaintiff as a minority stockholder, on behalf
and for the benefit of the defendant corporation, to require defendants
(directors) to account for and repay to the corporation moneys unlawfully paid out of the assets of the corporation to themselves, and for
other equitable relief. The complaint alleged that Ellington was employed in July, 1928, to work for the corporation at agreed salary, without additional compensation, and that in January 1929, at stockholder's
meeting, Ellington was elected as one of three directors, and then at
director's meeting was elected vice-president and secretary, and thereafter at same meeting, Ellington and corporation's president increased
their salaries, and approved bonus of Five Hundred Dollars to Ellington.
Two questions were presented to the court: First, Can a gratuitous
payment or bonus to director for services during preceding year, under
a contract for definite salary, be recovered by a minority stockholder
for corporation's benefit? Second, Does the complaint justify recovery
of director's salary increases without proof of abuse of power, bad
faith, willful abuse of discretion or positive fraud?
The law on the first question is clear; directors or managing officers of a corporation cannot legally vote to themselves or other officers
compensation for past services, where there is no agreement that such
officers should be paid. Ellington was employed upon an express contract at a stipulated certain salary, and performed his duties under it
until January 1929 when he became a director. Hence, the payment
of the bonus was to compensate him for these past services and was
without consideration. There was no implied promise on the part of
che corporation to pay him this bonus.
This rule results from the general rule that the officers are not impliedly entitled to compensation for services rendered, and accordingly
a payment for services which have been voluntarily rendered is void
as without consideration and is also ultra vires as a misapplication of
the corporate funds. Fletcher Ency. Corporations, Vol. 4, Par. 2762,
7 Ruling Case Law 466,467, L.R.A. 1915 D, 633,635, Marshall, Private
Corporations, Page 934, Par. 350, Thompson on Corporations, Third
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Edition, Vol. 3, Page 416, Par. 1833, and Godley vs. Crandall and
Godley Co., 212 N.Y. 121, 105 N.E. 818.
The Wisconsin Court in answering the second question appeared
to shy clear of the issue involved, made a choice between two possible
decisions, and then shifted the necessity for a decision upon the issue
by pointing out the lack of sufficient allegations in the complaint to
support their choice.
The court stated 'although Gaebler and Ellington are charged in
terms with having passed the resolution for the increased salaries and
bonus, in bad faith, to promote their own interests, and in disregard
of their duties as corporate officers to conserve the assets of the corporation, there are no allegations of facts or acts of a fraudulent or
deceitful character." The court was able to see the facts or acts necessary to apply the law as to compensation for past services, but ignored
the same facts or acts to apply the law as to the directors voting themselves an increase, although the right to "each arose out of the same
official act, the self-voted directors' resolution. The court seems to have
omitted comment on the issue whether or not the resolution passed
by the directors, part of which was void, and the other voidable, had
tainted the entire transaction with fraud. It did not observe that the
elevation of Ellington from an employee to director and their subsequent immediate action, over objection of minority stockholder, in
passing a resolution, part of which was void and the other voidable
was constructive fraud upon the minority stockholder, especially when
during this period the corporation was taking a loss of twenty thousand dollars during 1929 and five thousand dollars up to September
1930. In a leading case, Godley vs. Crandall and Godley Co., 212 N.Y.
121, where the directors voted themselves past and future compensation, the court said, "We are not disposed to hold that the resolution
of 1906 was fraudulent as to past services and honest as to the future.
Manifestly the increases paid for all of the years rested on the same
basis. The resolution was tainted with fraud and wholly void." And
in Hardee vs. Sunset Oil Co., 56 Fed. 51, at a meeting of the Board at
which the President, Secretary and the Treasurer were alone present,
they proceeded to vote themselves salaries, the court stated; "it does
not need authorities to show that the action of these three officers in
thus voting themselves salaries was absolutely void, and the ocmplainants are entitled to a decree so declaring the resolution." And Wight
vs. Heublein, 238 Fed. 321, "they will interfere at the suit of a minority stockholder, where the directors, who are trustees for all the stockholders, have voted to themselves as officers salaries which are excessive in view of the services rendered, and which therfore amount to
a legal fraud on the minority." And Schaffhauser vs. A. and S. Brew-
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ing Co., 218 Pa. 298, holds that an officer of a corporation cannot authorize an increase of pay for himself against the protest of a minority
of the directors and stockholders. And in Sotter vs. Coatesville Boiler
Works, 101 Atl. 744, where in a meeting of the Board of Directors
a resolution was passed to increase the salaries of the directors, it was
held to be constructive fraud in that the vote in support thereof was
participated in by interested directors.
The matter is quite new in Wisconsin. We have no decided cases,
as to the validity of a resolution for increase of directors salaries, proposed and voted on by themselves. The court did not wish to decide
the case under directors' compensation, but took the broader field of
corporate management. The Wisconsin Statute, Section 180.13 leaves
the directors in full control of compensation matters under their general right to the management of the corporation. In order to carry
out the spirit of the Statute, the court thought it best to designate the
directors' self-serving act as simply an act of mismanagement and a
part of the corporation's internal affairs, of which the equity courts
had no jurisdiction. In the face of this we have Justice Kerwin's statement in Figge vs. Bergenthal, 130 Wis. 594, 631, "It is elementary
law that an officer of a corporation while acting as a director cannot
fix his own salary so as to bind the corporation in an action by it or
by a non-consenting stockholder in its name challenging the validity of
the salary." and the general rule that an increase effected by interested
directors will be held voidable, and, in case of fraud, the directors may
be"held liable for the increase received."
Under the general heading of Corporate Management the court
had to make a choice between two principles, either that the corporate
officers are not permitted to use their position of trust and confidence
to further their private interests, or that the courts will not interfere
with internal management of corporate affairs in the absence of allegations clearly disclosing abuse of power by corporate officers, bad faith,
or willful abuse of discretion or positive fraud. Of the first, Wisconsin
had no positive adjudication and to support that view the court would
necessarily have to pass on the validity of the directors' resolution. Of
the second, Wisconsin has numerous decisions based primarily on
actual mismanagement of corporate affairs by the directors; but nothing in these decisions concern the validity of a resolution proposed and
voted on by themselves for an increase in salary. In Polacheck vs.
Michiwaukee Golf Club, 198 Wis. 78, the stockholders objected to the
leasing of the grounds without a profit and claimed it was mismanagement, but the court held no allegation of positive fraud, and would not
interfere with internal management of corporate affairs. In Goodwin
vs Von Cotzhausen 171 Wis. 351, the court decided that it would
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interfere here because defendant as director would, if he persisited in
acts of mismanagement, ruin the stockholders. In Fleischer vs. Pelton
Steel Co., 183 Wis. 451, the directors agreed to pay one of its managers a certain per cent of net profits; he objected because they deducted Income Tax before they paid him the agreed rate; contention
that it was mismanagement, but the court held no ulterior motive on
part of directors and would not interfere. Gesell vs. Tomahawk Land
Co., 184 Wis. 537, the minority stockholder attempted to force the
directors to declare a dividend in order to keep stock value up, the
court refused to interfere; no acts of mismanagement or fraud were
present.
It is not difficult to see why the court chose the latter proposition
to support its decision in the present case. It did not have to blaze
new trails. The question whether salaries paid by the directors to themselves was excessive or not rested upon the corporate body and the
court escaped an intricate solution. In Wisconsin, therefore, you must
allege and prove bad faith or willful abuse of discretion or positive
fraud on the part of directors in voting themselves an increase in salary in order that a minority stockholder can recover the excessive
increase.
Under the decision in this case it would appear that it is possible
for the directors on their own motion to increase their salaries each year
$30 more each week, and that such sum would not be excessive, but
if the increase was $300 more per week, with the same facts, and no
increase in corporate duties, the court would immediately see that it
was exorbitant, since on the face of the complaint it would show fraud
or an ultra vires act on their part and would be reached by demurrer.
Here Gaebler voted himself $30 more per week and Ellington $37.50
more per week as a director, and this court held the matter was purely
concerned with the internal management of corporate affairs, and was
not excessive. But had the same directors, under the same conditions,
voted themselves $300 per week, over the protest of the minority stockholders, it is doubtful that the court would sustain a demurrer to the
complaint because of insufficiency of allegations, as they would consider that as an act of fraud. Thus, the directors in a small corporation
might with ease vote themselves each year an additional $30 per week
and in a few years attain the same result, while the minority stockholders would be helpless; they can not set up the matter as a fraud
and it would be difficult to prove.
Ordinarily an official is not allowed to fix his own salary and therefore it would be more in conformity with equitable principles to have
the Board of Directors, without the presence of the interested Director,
or some other corporate body besides directors immediately interested,
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vote upon the, increase in their salaries; and if a case comes to trial
require the minority stockholders to come in with clear proof of
wrong-doing or oppression and have more than a claim based on
mere differences of opinion upon the question whether equal services
could have been procured for somewhat less. The Equity Courts should
stress proof, and a general allegation of the facts why such a salary
is excessive, this should be sufficient to give the minority stockholders
an opportunity to present their proof at the trial.
CLEMENT M.

MAWACKE

Easements: Prescription, Implied Grant, Necessity, Dedication and
Estoppel
Frank C. Shilling 'Co. v. Detry, 233 N.W. 635, Nyas an action
brought by the plaintiff, Frank C. Shilling Co., to determine their
interests in a tweniy foot strip of land lying on the western boundary
of certain land belonging to the defendant Detry. This strip separates
the defendant's land from the 'Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co.'s
right of way', and runs to another tract to the south owned by the
plaintiffs. The plaintiffs acquired title to this twenty foot strip, and also
to the larger lot to the south thereof, by a deed from Phoebe Elmore,
whose ancestor in title was Andrew E. Elmore, dated September 1926.
The defendant's claim dates back to August 1902 at which time he
acquired by a deed from Andrew E. Elmore an irregular lot'immediately to the east of this stirp. The title conveyance, recording, possession, etc., are all admitted.
The only question in issue is, as to the construction and effect of
certain language used in describing the boundaries of the land conveyed to the defendant to the effect that: "Commencing at a point,
* * * which point shall also be sufficient distance from the land of
the Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co. conveyed * * * so that an
alley might be established twenty feet in width extending southwesterly
along the railroad right of way." At the time this conveyance was
made, both the twenty foot strip and the lot conveyed were submerged.
Detry entered into possession immediately after conveyance was
made to him. He filled in this twenty foot strip with cinders so as to
make it usable as'a driveway. During the ensuing twenty-two years
both Detry and his tenants used this strip as an alley, and their user
was interrupted only once for a period of less than two years when a
restaurant erected in 1904 blocked their entrance to the northern end
of this strip. This restaurant was erected by a lessee of one of Detry's
tenants, and rental was paid for the use 'of the ground to both Detry's
tenant and to Elmore through his agent. After that two year period the
restaurant was moved so that it occupied only three fifths of the twenty

